Wage gains from foreign ownership: evidence from linked employer–employee data

Journal for Labour Market Research

Table 5 The wage advantage of ex-MNE workers in domestic firms over coworkers having arrived from other domestic firms—regression estimates

	Firm fixed effects:
	No	Yes
Model A: entire sample
Sending firm is MNE (F_After)	0.091*** (4.4)	0.077*** (4.9)
Change of employment in the sending firm (dL)	0.010* (1.8)	0.011*** (3.0)
Interaction term (F_After × dL)	− 0.028** (2.4)	− 0.024** (2.3)
MNE experience before entry to the sending firm (dummy)	0.059*** (6.0)	0.038*** (5.0)
Number of observations	723,421	722.913
aR²/within R²	0.461	0.288
Model B: workers arriving from mass layoffs and all workers
Employment change in the sending firm: L_t+1/L_t−1 ≤ 0.5
Sending firm is MNE	0.134*** (3.3)	0.109** (2.4)
MNE experience before entry to the sending firm (dummy)	0.068*** (2.9)	0.056*** (2.7)
Number of observations	153,482	153,213
aR²/within R²	0.479	0.277
Entire sample
Sending firm is MNE	0.060*** (4.1)	0.049*** (5.1)
MNE experience before entry to the sending firm (dummy)	0.058*** (6.0)	0.037*** (5.0)
Number of observations	723,421	722,913
aR²/within R²	0.461	0.288

Significant at the *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 level. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by persons and firms. Sample: 723,421 person-months belonging to 96,277 skilled workers in 19,449 domestic firms, who had arrived from MNEs versus other domestic firms. 508 singleton observations are excluded from the equation with firm fixed effects. Estimation: Stata reghdfe. Change of employment in the sending firm: L_t+1/L_t−1, where t is the year of the worker’s separation. Controls: person and job controls, contemporaneous and lagged firm-level controls, as listed in Table 12. Additional controls are completed tenure in the sending firm, dummy for unobserved tenure, months between exit from the sending firm and entry to the receiving firm, one-digit sectoral affiliation of the sending and receiving firms and year dummies