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Table 6 Profit-sharing and total compensation: departures from the base model

From: The impact of financial participation on workers' compensationDer Einfluss von finanzieller Mitarbeiterbeteiligung auf die Entlohnung der Arbeitnehmer

 

\( {\beta}_D \)

\( {\beta}_T \)

\( {\beta}_{TD} \)

Sample size

(1)  Base model

0.052

0.014

0.041

3,180

 

(0.009)

(0.019)

(0.015)

 

(2)  Varying post-treatment effect by year

2005

0.028

0.009

0.043

4,920

 

(0.008)

(0.018)

(0.012)

 

2006

0.036

 

0.043

 
 

(0.009)

 

(0.013)

 

(3)  Interacted with proportion of workers affected by profit-sharing

< 20%

0.052

0.007

0.018

3,180

 

(0.009)

(0.026)

(0.018)

 

20–99%

 

0.023

0.078

 
  

(0.045)

(0.040)

 

100%

 

0.021

0.055

 
  

(0.028)

(0.028)

 

(4)  Interacted with bargaining arrangements

No collective bargaining

0.052

0.029

0.026

3,180

 

(0.009)

(0.032)

(0.027)

 

Collective bargaining

 

0.006

0.049

 
  

(0.022)

(0.018)

 

(5)  Interacted with works council

No works council

0.052

0.062

0.023

3,177

 

(0.009)

(0.034)

(0.027)

 

Works council

 

−0.021

0.045

 
  

(0.019)

(0.017)

 

(6)  Interacted with plant size

< 20 employees

0.052

0.093

0.010

3,180

 

(0.009)

(0.060)

(0.050)

 

20–199 employees

 

0.012

0.055

 
  

(0.023)

(0.023)

 

> 200 employees

 

−0.025

0.031

 
  

(0.029)

(0.015)

 
  1. Note: Standard errors in parentheses are all robust to clustering at the plant level.